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Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck:
Taking the Public out of Public Access

J AMES A. H AMILTON *©
Introduction

In Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck,1 the Supreme Court
considered whether a public access channel operator could be considered a state
actor for First Amendment purposes.2 The Court found that the operation of a
public access channel “is not a traditional, exclusive . . . function” of a government.3
The Court also rejected the views that a public access channel is a public forum; 4
that mere regulation of a public access operator confers status as a state actor; 5 and
that the municipal franchising authority obtained a property interest in the public
access channels.6 However, the Court brushed aside prior decisions supporting the
conclusion that a municipal franchisor had a property interest in public access
channels sufficient to justify concluding that such channels are a constitutional
public forum.7 Additionally, the Court disregarded relevant facts and circumstances
that would justify a finding of state action based on entwinement between the city
and the public access operator.8

© James A. Hamilton, 2021.
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author would like to
express his gratitude to his fellow editors of the Journal of Business & Technology Law for their feedback and
guidance throughout the challenging process of writing and editing this note. The author would also like to
thank Professor Mark Graber for his keen insights and commentary. Finally and most importantly, the author
would like to thank his wife Jennifer and daughter Alexis for their love, understanding, and support, without
which none of this would have been possible.
1. 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
2. Id. at 1926.
3. Id. at 1930.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1932.
6. Id. at 1933.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.
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Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
I. The Case

Respondents DeeDee Halleck and Jesús Papoleto Meléndez, two community
media producers based in New York City, developed a contentious relationship with
the Manhattan Community Access Corp., locally known as the Manhattan
Neighborhood Network (“MNN”), between 2011 and 2015.9 Halleck is a media
activist and Professor Emerita of the Department of Communication at the
University of California, San Diego, 10 and has been active in Manhattan public
television since the 1970s.11 Meléndez is a Nuyorican poet and playwright who grew
up in East Harlem12 and has been active assisting Harlem youth and senior citizens
in producing content for public television since the 1990s. 13 MNN is a non-profit
corporation that operates public access channels for broadcast on cable television
systems in Manhattan.14 After MNN suspended Halleck and Meléndez from using
MNN’s facilities, the two media producers filed suit in October 2015 15 against MNN,
several of its officers, and the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 16
for violating their First Amendment 17 rights.18
Prior to December 2011, Halleck and Meléndez had been regular producers of
public access television content in Manhattan.19 In December 2011, Halleck
attempted to attend a MNN board meeting to discuss the reinstatement of a
9. See generally First Amended Complaint 39–124, Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238
(S.D.N.Y.
2016)(No.
15-cv-08141),
ECF
No.
39,
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.448711/gov.uscourts.nysd.448711.39.0.pdf.
10. DeeDee
Halleck,
DEP’T
OF
COMMC’N,
UNIV.
OF
CAL.
SAN
DIEGO,
https://communication.ucsd.edu/people/profiles/halleck-deedee.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
11. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 39.
12. Jesús Papoleto Meléndez, POETRY FOUND., https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poets/jesus-papoletomelendez (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
13. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 40.
14. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
15. Joint Appendix at 6, Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) (No. 17-1702),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-1702/74098/20181204145550699_171702%20Joint%20Appendix.pdf.
16. In relevant part, § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of law,
deprives another of a constitutionally protected right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). In such a suit, § 1988 authorizes
the award of costs and attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018).
17. In relevant part, the First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 1. In addition to their First Amendment claim, Halleck and
Meléndez included supplemental claims under the free speech protection of the New York State Constitution
and a violation of the New York Open Meetings Law. Id. 134–43. These supplemental claims under state law
were dismissed by the District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after it dismissed the First
Amendment claim, the sole federal law claim. Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2018),
rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019). This Note addresses only the First Amendment claim.
19. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 39–40.
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community media grant and a youth program.20 Petitioner Daniel Coughlin, then
Executive Director of MNN,21 denied Halleck entry and informed her that the board
meetings are closed to the public.22 Subsequently, Halleck and Meléndez were
invited by Coughlin to attend the March 2012 board meeting. 23 However, when
Halleck attempted to videotape the meeting, Coughlin abruptly brought the
meeting to a close.24
Meléndez was invited in January 2012 to participate in MNN’s Community
Leadership Program (CLP) by Iris Morales, the director of MNN’s El Barrio Firehouse
facility.25 The CLP was a 10-week training program in media production intended
for “individuals of artistic merit and community commitment . . . .”26 Meléndez
attended the March 14, 2012, MNN board meeting with Halleck, which was on the
same evening as one of the CLP training sessions.27 Meléndez returned to the CLP
session after the board meeting’s abrupt adjournment.28 Shortly after Meléndez
returned to the training session, Morales pulled Meléndez out to talk to him
outside.29 Once outside, Morales screamed at Meléndez, apparently upset with him
for attending the board meeting with Halleck.30 At the next week’s CLP training
session, on March 21, Meléndez learned that he was “barred from participation” in
the CLP.31 When Meléndez met with Morales at the El Barrio Firehouse two days
later, on March 23, to discuss the situation, Meléndez alleges that Morales
screamed at him again, “threw crumpled papers at him, and [physically] struck
him . . . .”32 When a security guard showed up to investigate the commotion,
Meléndez left the firehouse.33 In April 2012, Coughlin informed Meléndez by letter
that he had been removed from the CLP as a result of the confrontation with
Morales.34 However, Meléndez asserts in the complaint that the real reason for his
removal was his association with Halleck at the March 2012 MNN board meeting.35
This assertion is bolstered by the letter’s reference to the March 23 confrontation

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. 41–42.
Id. 12.
Id. 43.
Id. 49.
Id. 55.
Id. 45.
Id. 46–47.
Id. 53–54.
Id. 56.
Id. 57–58.
Id. 59, 71.
Id. 62.
Id. 64–65.
Id. 67–68.
Id. 69–70.
Id. 71.
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Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
with Morales that only took place after Meléndez had already been barred from
attending the CLP training session on March 21.36
In July 2012, the situation escalated further at the formal opening of the El Barrio
Firehouse, an invitation-only event attended by “a select group of public officials,
including then Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer” and a New York City
Council member.37 Although Halleck and Meléndez were not invited to the event,
they stood outside the firehouse facility and attempted to interview attendees. 38
Jose Angel Figueroa, a member of the CLP, responded to Halleck’s attempt to
interview him by uttering profanity at Halleck and Meléndez.39 When Meléndez
verbally reciprocated the sentiment, Figueroa moved towards Meléndez as if to
physically strike him.40 After a security guard intervened, Figueroa entered the
firehouse, leaving Halleck and Meléndez outside to continue interviewing the
arriving guests.41 Later at the event, Meléndez remarked to Halleck that he thought
it was ironic that he was being kept out of the El Barrio Firehouse facility by “our
people, people of color” and that he would have to wait until “they are fired, or
they retire, or someone kills them” before he would have access to the MNN
facility.42
After the El Barrio Firehouse opening event, Halleck submitted her program “The
1% Visits El Barrio” to MNN for broadcast.43 Halleck’s program contained the
interviews conducted by Halleck and Meléndez from the El Barrio Firehouse
event.44 MNN aired the program on October 2, 2012.45 Halleck’s program presented
the respondents’ opinion that MNN is “more interested in pleasing ‘the 1%’ than
addressing the community programming needs” of East Harlem residents.46 After
airing Halleck’s program, MNN notified Halleck that she had been suspended from
using MNN’s facilities for three months as a result of her program. 47 Specifically,
MNN described Meléndez’s statement that he would have to wait for access to the
El Barrio Firehouse facility until the staff were “fired, or they retire, or someone kills
them” as an incitement to violence, in contravention of MNN’s content policies.48
36.

See id. 62, 70.
Id. 72–73.
38. Id. 74.
39. Id. 75–76; see also DeeDee Halleck, The 1% Visits El Barrio; Whose Community?, YOUTUBE, at 01:42 (July
29, 2012), http://youtu.be/QEbMTGEQ1xc.
40. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 77–78; see also Halleck, supra note 39, at 01:50.
41. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 79–80; see also Halleck, supra note 39, at 01:56.
42. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 81; see also Halleck, supra note 39, at 21:20.
43. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 82–83; see generally Halleck, supra note 39.
44. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 83.
45. Id. 84.
46. Id. 83.
47. Id. 85–86.
48. Id. 86–87.
37.
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Halleck protested the suspension, arguing that Meléndez’s statement was
“expressing his despair” at the situation, not inciting violence.49 Halleck argued that
the suspension was, in reality, a result of her questioning “the transparency and
accountability of MNN’s management.”50
The following year, in July 2013, Halleck and Meléndez had a chance meeting
with Coughlin at a party hosted by a mutual friend. 51 Meléndez attempted to
engage in a polite discussion with Coughlin about Meléndez’s status at MNN.52
However, after Coughlin rebuffed Meléndez’s attempt at “a constructive discussion,
. . . Halleck led . . . Meléndez away.”53 A few weeks later, in a letter citing the events
over the past 18 months, Coughlin suspended Meléndez’s access to MNN facilities
indefinitely for violation of MNN’s “zero-tolerance” policy regarding harassing or
threatening behavior toward MNN associates.54 Citing similar concerns, as well as
the number of complaints 55 MNN received about Halleck’s “The 1% Visits El Barrio”
video, Coughlin suspended Halleck’s use of MNN facilities for one year.56
MNN confirmed in April 2015 that Meléndez’s indefinite suspension remained in
effect when Meléndez attempted to submit a new project for airing. 57 Further,
although Halleck’s suspension has ended, Halleck has been unable to air any
program containing Meléndez on MNN, including “The 1% Visits El Barrio,” because
of Meléndez’s indefinite suspension.58
Respondents filed their Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York on October 15, 2015,59 and they filed their First Amended
Complaint on February 19, 2016.60 Halleck and Meléndez asserted a claim against
the City of New York, MNN, and three MNN officers for violating their First
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as supplementary state law
claims under similar provisions of the New York constitution and the New York Open
Meetings Law.61 Halleck and Meléndez sought injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.62 The district court granted the defendants’
49.

Id. 91–92.
Id. 93.
51. Id. 98.
52. Id. 99.
53. Id. 103.
54. Id. 104–09.
55. Coughlin’s letter did not provide details about the complaints, other than that they related to Halleck’s
public posting of her “The 1% Visits El Barrio” program on YouTube. Id. 113.
56. Id. 111–14.
57. Id. 117–19.
58. Id. 116.
59. Joint Appendix, supra note 15, at 6.
60. Id. at 9; see generally First Amended Complaint, supra note 9.
61. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 1–2.
62. Id. A–D.
50.
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Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with respect to the First Amendment
claim.63 Having dismissed the only federal claim, the district court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.64
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal with respect to the City of
New York on the theory that the City had not taken action sufficient to give rise to
liability for Halleck’s and Meléndez’s claims.65 However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the district court’s dismissal with respect to MNN and its employees on
the basis that MNN operates a public forum under authority delegated by the
municipality.66 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jacobs asserted that the reversal with
respect to MNN is inconsistent with Second Circuit precedent and also creates a
circuit split with the Sixth Circuit.67 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the circuit split.68
II. Legal Background

The Court’s reasoning in Halleck is based on the state-action doctrine, as applied
in light of the tumultuous history of regulation of public access cable channels. 69
Federal regulation of public, educational, and government access channels (“PEG
channels”) developed slowly from the origin of cable television in the 1950s and
1960s but accelerated rapidly at the onset of the 1970s. 70 The contemporary
regulatory environment, as applied to MNN, solidified with the enactment of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.71 However, despite several cases
discussing the legal status of PEG channels, the Court had not previously given clear
guidance as to whether a PEG channel is a public forum for constitutional
purposes.72
The Supreme Court has routinely held that actions by a private entity cannot give
rise to a constitutional violation unless the private action can be fairly attributed to

63. Halleck v. City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2018), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
64. Id. at 247.
65. Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2018), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
66. Id. at 307–08.
67. Id. at 314 (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1927–28 (2019) (noting the split in authority
between the Second Circuit’s Halleck decision and the outcomes of Wilcher v. City of Akron, 498 F.3d 516 (6th
Cir. 2007), and Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
69. See infra Part III.
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. See infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text; see also Cable Franchise Agreement by and Between
the City of New York and Time Warner NY Cable LLC, CITY OF NEW YORK § 1.8,
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doitt/downloads/pdf/time_warner_cable_franchise_agreement_manhattan_n
orth.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (defining “Cable Act” as “The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984”).
72. See infra Part II.B.
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the state.73 This has led, over time, to the development of the state-action doctrine,
under which only state actors—not private actors—can be held liable for
constitutional violations.74 However, as the Court has observed, “cases deciding
when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of
consistency.”75 Although the Court emphasizes that the facts and circumstances of
any given case will determine whether state action is present, there are some tests
that the Court has developed to distinguish private action from state action. 76
A. State-Action Requirement in Constitutional Violations
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech guarantee protects only against
governmental interference, not private interference. 77 Courts apply the stateaction doctrine to demarcate the boundary between proscribed governmental
interference and permitted private interference with free speech rights.78 There are
multiple potential avenues to a finding of state action, the most relevant of which
are: the exercise by the private entity of a traditional, exclusive public function;
governmental encouragement of the private actor; and joint activity or
entwinement between the government and the private actor. 79
The leading case on the exclusive public function test is Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.80 In Jackson, the Court reasoned that when a private actor exercises
public functions “traditionally associated with sovereignty,” state action is
present.81 In this case, the Court considered whether state action was present when
an electric utility company cut off service to a customer without adequate notice. 82
The petitioner contended that state action was present because the state had
granted the electric company a monopoly and required the company to provide
“reasonably continuous” service within the state.83 The Court rejected this
argument because state law only imposed the service obligation on the utility
company, not on the state itself. 84 Supplying electric service is not, the Court held,

73.

Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928.
See id.
75. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
76. See infra Part II.A.
77. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928.
78. See id.
79. Id. (citing first Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352–54 (1974); then Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982); and then Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941–42 (1982)).
80. 419 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 347.
83. Id. at 347–48.
84. Id. at 353.
74.
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Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.”85 As a result, the Court
concluded that the utility company fell outside the ambit of the due process
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.86
The Court analyzed the governmental encouragement test in Blum v. Yaretsky.87
The Blum respondents were patients at nursing facilities receiving federal financial
assistance through the Medicaid program. 88 These patients challenged the
decisions made by the nursing facilities to reduce their level of care under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 89 The patients argued that the state
“affirmatively commands” the actions taken by the nursing facilities. 90 The Court
found, to the contrary, that the state did not become responsible for the challenged
actions by requiring the attending physician to complete an assessment form when
attesting to the medical necessity of nursing care.91 Although the state’s form
provided a numerical score, the physician was nonetheless authorized to
recommend nursing care for patient despite giving the patient a low score on the
assessment form.92 Therefore, the Court found that the determination of medical
necessity was rendered by the physician, using sound professional judgment, not
an action of the state.93 The Court also gave little weight to the fact that the state
penalized nursing homes for failing to discharge or transfer patients who no longer
had a medical need for care, since the decision about medical necessity was also
left to the professional determination of physicians.94 The Court further concluded
that mere funding of the challenged activities by the state, even where that funding
covered the care for 90% of patients in the covered care facilities, was insufficient
to attribute responsibility for decision-making to the state for the purposes of
satisfying the state action doctrine.95
The Supreme Court assessed joint action between the state and a private actor
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.96 In that case, Burton claimed
discriminatory state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when he was
denied access to the Eagle Coffee Shoppe on account of his race. 97 Although the
85.

Id.
Id. at 358.
87. 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982); see also Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928
(2019) (describing Blum v. Yaretsky as a case assessing governmental compulsion of a private entity’s action).
88. Id. at 993.
89. Id. at 996.
90. Id. at 1005.
91. Id. at 1006–07.
92. Id. at 1006.
93. Id. at 1006–07.
94. Id. at 1009–10.
95. Id. at 1011.
96. 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
97. Id. at 716.
86.
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coffee shop was a private restaurant, the lessor of the premises was a Delaware
state agency, the Wilmington Parking Authority.98 The coffee shop was located in a
parking garage building owned and operated by the Parking Authority.99 When the
Parking Authority built the parking garage, it used funds donated by the city and
obtained by issuing bonds.100 However, the parking revenues alone were not
expected to be able to service the debt on the bonds.101 As a result, the Parking
Authority leased space in the building to commercial tenants, including the Eagle
Coffee Shoppe.102 Noting that the commercial leases were “a physically and
financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part of the State’s plan to operate its
project as a self-sustaining unit” and that the coffee shop’s profits had become
“indispensable elements” in the parking garage’s success, the Court found
adequate ground to attribute the coffee shop’s actions to the state.103 The state had
“insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with the coffee shop, and
therefore the state was a joint participant in its activities.104 As a result, the coffee
shop was bound by the protections guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment.105
More recently, the Court expanded on the principles laid out in Burton and Blum
in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.106 In
Brentwood Academy, the Court considered whether a not-for-profit corporation
established to regulate high school sports could be subject to suit under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.107 The Court determined that the “nominally private
character” of the Athletic Association was overwhelmed by its “pervasive
entwinement” with public entities.108 The Court observed that: (1) the Association’s
membership was 84% public schools;109 (2) membership in the Association’s
governing board was restricted to administrators of the member schools; 110 (3)
employees of the Association were eligible to join the state’s public employee
retirement system;111 and (4) the State Board of Education had the authority to

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 719.
Id.
Id. at 723–24.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
531 U.S. 288 (2001).
Id. at 291, 293.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291.
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select nonvoting members of the Association’s board.112 The association received a
small portion of its revenue from fees paid by member schools, but the majority of
its revenue was derived from admission fees to its various athletic events. 113 In
1972, the State Board of Education had expressly designated the Association to
supervise athletic activities of the state’s public schools.114 This express designation
was replaced in 1996 with an authorization for public schools to join the Association
voluntarily.115 However, the Court found it significant that despite the removal of
the formal designation, the State Board retained its authority to seat nonvoting
members of the Association’s board.116 Further, Association employees were still
permitted to participate in the state retirement system. 117 Taking into account all
of the facts and circumstances, the Court held that the entwinement of between
the state and the Athletic Association made the Association a state actor for
constitutional purposes.118
B. Public, Educational, and Government Access Channels
When the first commercial cable television119 system was established in 1950,
there was no federal regulation of cable television.120 In a 1959 order, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) determined that the FCC did not have plenary
authority to regulate cable television systems under its statutory grant of power
under the Communications Act of 1934.121 At that time, the FCC sought to have
Congress adopt additional legislation that would give the Commission authority
over cable television, but the proposed bill failed. 122 However, despite the lack of
additional statutory authority, the FCC began increasingly to regulate cable
television systems over the course of the 1960s. 123 By 1966, the FCC concluded that
it did have regulatory authority over cable television, and the Commission issued

112.

Id. at 301.
Id. at 299.
114. Id. at 292.
115. Id. at 292–93.
116. Id. at 301.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 302.
119. The original nomenclature for cable television, used frequently in older documents, was “community
antenna television” (CATV). See United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649, 651 n.3
(1972) (plurality opinion). For consistency, this Note will use the modern term: cable television.
120. See generally United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161–67 (1968) (discussing the early history
of cable television regulation).
121. Id. at 164; see also Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, 24 Fed. Reg. 3,004, 3,018,
26 F.C.C. 403, 441 (April 18, 1959).
122. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. at 164–65.
123. Id. at 165.
113.
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new regulations124 over the cable television industry.125 When these new
regulations were challenged, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.126 that regulation of cable television did fall within the
ambit of the FCC’s authority under the Communications Act and thus upheld the
challenged regulations.127
In 1969, the FCC went further in regulation of cable television to add the local
origination rule.128 Under this new rule, cable television systems with more than
3,500 subscribers were required to “operate[] to a significant extent as a local outlet
by cablecasting129 and ha[ve] available facilities for local production and
presentation of programs other than automated services.”130 This concept of
cablecasting was intended to “increas[e] the number of outlets for community selfexpression” by encouraging production and distribution of locally produced
programming, such as local news reports or presentations by local government
officials.131 One of the affected cable television operators, Midwest Video Corp.,
sued the FCC to set aside the new local origination rule on the basis that such a rule
exceeds the statutory authority of the FCC. 132 In United States v. Midwest Video
Corp. (Midwest Video I),133 the Supreme Court once again upheld the regulations as
within the Commission’s authority, as previously recognized in Southwestern
Cable.134
In a series of orders from 1972 to 1976, the FCC developed rules requiring cable
television operators to maintain at least four channels for public, educational, local

124. The FCC’s 1966 regulations on the cable television industry were the first regulation of television
broadcasting by wire, as compared to previous regulation of CATV service by microwave radio. Id. at 166–67.
The new regulations covered both microwave and cable service. Id. at 166. These regulations governed
“carriage of local signals,” as well as “nonduplication of local programming.” Id. Additionally, the regulations
forbade any new importation of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets, except where the FCC
found it would be in the public interest to do so. Id. at 166–67.
125. Id. at 166; see also Amendments Relating to Community Antenna Television Systems, 31 Fed. Reg.
4,540, 4,548, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 745 (Mar. 17, 1966).
126. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
127. Id. at 178.
128. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. 649, 653–54 (1972) (plurality opinion); see also First Report and Order, 34
Fed. Reg. 17,651, 17,653, 17,660, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 208, 223 (Oct. 31, 1969); 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111 (1970) (repealed
1974).
129. Cablecasting, as defined at the time of the Midwest Video I decision, meant “programing distributed
on a CATV system which has been originated by the CATV operator or by another entity, exclusive of broadcast
signals carried on the system.” Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 653 n.6 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101(j) (1970)).
130. Id. at 653–54 (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1970)) (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 654 (quoting First Report and Order, supra note 128, at 17,651, 20 F.C.C.2d at 202); First Report
and Order, supra note 128, at 17,655–56, 20 F.C.C.2d at 213–14.
132. Midwest Video I, 406 U.S. at 657.
133. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
134. Id. at 670.
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governmental, and leased access.135 In the midst of this process, the FCC repealed
the earlier local origination rule.136 Instead, cable operators were required to
provide for “first-come, nondiscriminatory” use of the public access channel,
without charge, subject to limited rules. 137 When Midwest Video Corp. brought a
fresh challenge to the FCC’s new rules, the Supreme Court found—unlike previous
cases—that the FCC had gone too far. 138 By imposing rules requiring public access
channels and prohibiting cable operators from exercising control over content, the
FCC had, in effect, imposed “common carrier”139 obligations on the cable
operators.140 However, as the Court observed, Congress had expressly provided by
law that broadcasters were not to be treated as common carriers. 141 The Court
reasoned that this prohibition should also extend to operators of cable television
systems.142 In doing so, the Court rejected the FCC’s access rules and held that
authority to compel public access service must originate from Congress. 143
Congress eventually tackled public access channels in the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984.144 Rather than invest authority to establish and regulate PEG
channels in the FCC, Congress authorized state and local governments to condition
cable operator franchise grants on provisions for PEG channels.145 Under the terms
of the 1984 Act, cable operators were prohibited from exercising editorial control

135. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 691–92 (1979), superseded by statute,
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984), as recognized in Manhattan
Cmty. Access Corp. v Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a) (1977), invalidated by
Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
136. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 699 n.8 (citing Report and Order in Docket No. 19,988, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090,
1105–06 (1974)).
137. Id. at 693–94 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(b), (d) (1977)). Specifically, cable operators were required to
adopt rules prohibiting public access channel users from presenting lottery information, commercial
advertising, and obscene or indecent content. Id. at 693 & n.4 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d) (1977)).
138. See id. at 708.
139. As the Court explained, “[a] common-carrier service in the communications context is one that ‘makes
a public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to
employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing . . . .” Id. at
701 (alteration in original) (quoting Report and Order, Industrial Radiolocation Service, Docket No. 16,106, 5
F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966)).
140. Id. at 701–02.
141. Id. at 704 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 108–09 (1973));
see also Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 3(h), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (1934) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 153(11)).
142. Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 708.
143. Id. at 709.
144. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 789 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); see also Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 611, 98 Stat. 2779, 2782 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 531).
145. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 789–90 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (citing Cable Communications Policy Act § 611).
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over PEG channel content.146 In enacting this legislation, Congress characterized
public access channels as “the video equivalent of the speaker’s soap box or the
electronic parallel to the printed leaflet.”147
In 1992, Congress acted further to enable cable operators to restrict “any
programming which contains obscene material, sexually explicit conduct, or
material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct” from appearing on PEG
channels.148 This provision was challenged by a group of public access content
creators and viewers in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC.149 In a highly fractured decision—containing six separate opinions and
majority agreement with only a narrow portion of Justice Breyer’s plurality
opinion—the Court overturned the 1992 Act insofar as it permitted cable operators
to censor obscene material on PEG channels.150 In this decision, the justices
described public access channels as “part of the consideration an operator gives
[the government] in return for permission . . . to use public rights-of-way”;151
creations of “contracts forged between cable operators and local cable franchising
authorities”;152 and “designated public for[a] of unlimited character.”153 However,
the Court did not reach a consensus on whether a public access channel is, in fact,
a constitutional public forum.154 Significantly, Justice Kennedy observed that a
public forum—which would be subject to First Amendment protections—is neither
limited to “physical gathering places” nor to “property owned by the
government.”155 However, Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion was joined only by
Justice Ginsberg.156 The Court concluded only that permitting cable operators to
restrict obscene material on PEG channels violated the First Amendment as “not
appropriately tailored” to meet the “legitimate objective of protecting children.”157

146.

Cable Communications Policy Act § 611(e).
Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 30 (1984)).
148. Id. at 735 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486, invalidated by Denver Area, 518 U.S. 727 (1996)).
149. Id. at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
150. Id. at 768 (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 734.
152. Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
154. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1937 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
155. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (first citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); and
then citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
156. Id. at 780. Justice Stevens also wrote approvingly of Justice Kennedy’s analysis generally, but he did not
believe it was necessary to categorically describe public access channels as public fora. Id. at 768 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
157. Id. at 733 (plurality opinion).
147.
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III. The Court’s Reasoning

In Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck,158 the Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether MNN, a public access channel operator, is
subject to the freedom of speech protections of the First Amendment. 159 Justice
Kavanaugh’s majority opinion held that MNN is a private actor, not a state actor. 160
As a result, MNN cannot be liable for infringing on the respondents’ First
Amendment rights.161
The Court first assessed whether MNN could be a state actor under the exclusive
public function test.162 The Court emphasized that under this test, the function must
be both “traditionally” and “exclusively” one performed by the government. 163
Stressing that “very few” functions meet that test, the Court identified two clear
examples that satisfy the test: “running elections and operating a company
town.”164 However, the majority was quick to elaborate many functions that have
been ruled out as traditional, exclusive public functions: “running sports
associations and leagues, administering insurance payments, operating nursing
homes, providing special education, representing indigent criminal defendants,
resolving private disputes, and supplying electricity.”165 The Court considered
whether operating public access channels on a cable television system was a
traditional, exclusive function performed by the government. 166 Noting that
Manhattan already had a history of other private entities that operated public
access channels before MNN was formed, the Court summarily determined that
operating a public access channel is not a traditional, exclusive governmental
function.167
The Court next assessed the respondents’ argument that the function in
question is, more broadly, the operation of a “public forum for speech.”168 The
Court rejected this argument by predicating the finding of a public forum on first
finding state action.169 The Court observed that when a forum for speech is provided
by the government, such as on sidewalks, in streets and parks, or in a private theater

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

172

139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
Id. at 1926.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1928–29.
Id. at 1929.
Id. (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1929–30.
Id. at 1930.
Id.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Hamilton (Do Not Delete)

8/16/2022 5:16 AM

JAMES A. HAMILTON
leased to a city, the forum is a public one.170 In contrast, where the forum is
provided by a private actor, such as a grocery store bulletin board or a comedy club
open mic night, the forum is subject to control by the private actor, without regard
for First Amendment protections.171 The Court centered its public forum analysis on
the holding in Hudgens v. NLRB.172 In Hudgens, the Court held that union employees
did not have a First Amendment right to advertise a strike on the private property
of a shopping center.173 Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion in Halleck summarized
that merely providing a forum for speech does not transform a private actor into a
state actor.174 In a footnote, the Court rejected the argument that private property
dedicated to public use, as suggested in a prior case, might be sufficient grounds for
finding state action.175 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc.,
the Court observed in dicta that “a speaker must seek access to public property or
to private property dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment
concerns . . . .”176 However, the Court in Halleck rejected the proposition that
private property can be subjected to First Amendment protections when the private
owner opens that property as a venue for public speech. 177
The Court further addressed the argument for state action through the
relationship between MNN and the City of New York. 178 The Court likened the City’s
designation of MNN as operator of the public access channels to a license, contract,
or state-sanctioned monopoly.179 Observing the wide range of precedents holding
state regulation insufficient to support a finding of state action, the Court rejected
the argument that MNN’s designation from the City could form the basis for finding
state action.180 The Court specifically compared MNN to the electric utility in
Jackson to bolster its finding that mere regulation of MNN cannot make MNN a
state actor.181 Rather, the Court observed that the regulations imposed on MNN
make it more closely resemble a common carrier, not a state actor. 182

170.

Id.
Id.
172. Id. at 1930–31 (discussing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517–21 (1976)).
173. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520–21.
174. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930.
175. Id. at 1931 n.3 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)).
176. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (1985) (emphasis added).
177. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1931 n.3. This is the same argument supported by Justice Kennedy in Denver Area.
See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 792 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
178. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1931.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1931–32
181. Id. at 1932 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)).
182. Id.
171.
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Finally, the Court addressed whether the public access channels in question were
property of New York City, rather than being property of the cable system operator
or MNN.183 Under that theory, MNN might be a state actor as agent for the City in
managing its property.184 The Court observed that the cable operator owns the
cable network that contains the channels and that MNN operates those channels
using its own facilities and equipment. 185 The cable operator’s franchise agreements
made no assignment of leases, easements, or other property interests in the public
access channels to the City.186 The Court noted that the franchise agreements
merely granted the City the right to designate a private entity as operator of the
channels.187 The Court also rejected the idea that the cable operator’s use of public
rights-of-way could provide a path to finding state action, observing that the electric
utility in Jackson likewise used public rights-of-way for its operation.188 The Court
conceded only that if the City had actually operated the public access channels
itself, there would be state action in its operation of the channels. 189
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor contended that the Manhattan public access
channels should be properly viewed as a public forum and that the City created an
agency relationship with MNN for their administration.190 Justice Sotomayor argued
that the City obtained a property interest in the public access channels when it
concluded the franchise agreements with the cable operator. 191 As a result, Justice
Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, would have held that
MNN was subject to First Amendment limitations.192
In assessing whether the public access channels were governmental property,
Justice Sotomayor observed that state regulations required the City to obtain public
access channels in the franchise agreement with the cable operator. 193 Noting that
the City thereby obtained an “exclusive right to use these channels,” Justice
Sotomayor found that the City did have a property interest in the channels, “akin at
the very least to an easement.”194 Justice Sotomayor found that in the fractured
opinions in Denver Area, five Justices had made the same comparison between the

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

174

Id. at 1933.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1933–34.
Id. at 1934.
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1935 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, §§ 895.1(f), 895.4(b)(1) (2016)).
Id. at 1937.
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governmental right to public access channels and a public easement. 195 The right to
control programming on the public access channels, argued Justice Sotomayor, is
just as much a property right as if the City had leased advertising space on a
billboard.196 Because that public forum was opened by the City deliberately for the
purpose of hosting speech, Justice Sotomayor would have held that the public
access channels are a constitutional public forum.197
Having determined the channels to be a public forum, Justice Sotomayor next
argued that the City should not be able to avoid its constitutional obligations by
contracting out their administration to a private entity.198 This argument followed
from the Court’s holding in West v. Atkins,199 in which the Court held that a private
doctor contracted by the state to provide medical care in state prisons is a state
actor.200 Were this not the case, the government could avoid any constitutional
obligation it wanted by merely contracting out the performance of government
functions.201 Likewise, the City of New York made a “choice that triggers
constitutional obligations” and thereafter contracted that obligation to a private
entity.202 As a result, that private entity—MNN—should be deemed to be a state
actor for constitutional purposes.203
Justice Sotomayor next addressed the majority’s reliance on Jackson as
controlling the outcome of this case.204 Justice Sotomayor summarized the holding
of Jackson and its progeny as a rejection of state action where a private entity enters
the marketplace and is “highly regulated” by the state.205 In contrast, Justice
Sotomayor assessed MNN not as a “private entity that simply ventured into the
marketplace” but rather as having been “deputized” by the City to administer its
public forum.206 “To say that MNN is nothing more than a private organization
regulated by the government is like saying that a waiter at a restaurant is an
independent food seller who just happens to be highly regulated by the restaurant’s
owners.”207

195. Id. (first citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760–61 (1996) (plurality
opinion); and then citing Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 793–94 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part)).
196. Id. at 1938.
197. Id. at 1939.
198. Id. at 1939–40.
199. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
200. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1940 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)).
201. Id. (citing West, 487 U.S. at 56 n.14).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1941.
204. Id. at 1942.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1942–43.
207. Id. at 1943.
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Justice Sotomayor also addressed the Court’s relegation of West v. Atkins to a
footnote.208 The majority opinion dismissed the relevance of West by observing
that, unlike providing medical care to inmates, there is no constitutional obligation
for the government to operate public access channels. 209 To the contrary, Justice
Sotomayor found that once the City had opened a public forum by obtaining the
public access channels from the cable operator, the requirement to operate the
channels in accordance with the First Amendment followed. 210 Justice Sotomayor
rejected the majority’s comparison of MNN to a private comedy club. 211 Rather,
Justice Sotomayor compared the situation to a state college that, having tired of
running its own annual comedy showcase of student performers, hired a local
nonprofit to run the show in its place.212 Justice Sotomayor would not permit the
state college to evade its First Amendment obligations merely by contracting out its
activities.213 Neither would she, under that logic, allow the City of New York to
escape its constitutional duties by contracting out the management of its public
access channels to MNN.214
IV. Analysis

The Court in Halleck erred in finding that the public access channels were not a
public forum.215 First, Halleck and Meléndez alleged adequate facts to show that
the City of New York had created a public forum, over which MNN was designated
its agent.216 Additional facts that could have been brought out had the case not
been resolved by motion to dismiss would have borne out this theory further. 217
Further, the Court brushed aside prior decisions supporting the conclusion that a
municipal franchisor had a property interest in public access channels sufficient to
justify concluding that such channels are a constitutional public forum. 218 Even if
the City hadn’t created a constitutional public forum under MNN’s jurisdiction, the
Court still should have found sufficient entwinement between the City of New York
and MNN under the line of cases following Burton.219

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
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Id.
Id. (citing id. at 1929 n.1 (majority opinion)).
Id.
Id. at 1944; see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1944 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1945.
See infra Part IV.A.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1942 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Public Access Channels Are Properly Viewed as Public Forum
Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, correctly argued that the public access
channels managed by MNN are a public forum.220 The majority insisted that the City
of New York had no “formal easement or other property interest” in the public
access channels managed by MNN.221 However, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out,
this case was being heard on appeal from a motion to dismiss.222 Halleck and
Meléndez need not prove their case to survive a motion to dismiss: at the pleading
stage, their “factual allegations must be accepted as true.”223 Justice Sotomayor
believed that Halleck and Meléndez had alleged adequate facts in their complaint
to raise at least a factual question as to the property rights held by the City in the
public access channels.224 To resolve any lingering doubt about the sufficiency of
proof of the producers’ claims, the Court could have remanded the case for further
development of the record.225
If the Court had remanded the case for further facts to be developed, the
respondents might have demonstrated that MNN had dedicated at least some of
its facilities, including the El Barrio Firehouse production facility, to “City
Purpose[s]” in a City Purpose Covenant filed in the New York real property
records.226 In MNN’s Declaration of Restrictive Covenant, MNN recited that the City
had provided funding for its Community Media Center. 227 In exchange for the
funding, MNN recorded a covenant that the El Barrio Firehouse premises would be
used for 25 years for the benefit of the City, either as a community media center,
for ancillary purposes related to running the media center, or for activities approved
by the Mayor of the City of New York. 228 Although the covenant does not cover the
public access channels themselves, it does cover the MNN facility where the
challenged actions took place.229 Further, it substantiates the idea—the absence of

220.

See infra notes 221–49 and accompanying text.
Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1933 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 828
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
222. Id. at 1942 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1935.
224. Id. at 1942.
225. Id.
226. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., Declaration of Restrictive Covenant, CITY OF NEW YORK, 1–2 (Sept. 14,
2009), https://a836-acris.nyc.gov/DS/DocumentSearch/DocumentImageView?doc_id=2010020100299001.
227. Id. at 1.
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id. at 1 (describing the covered premises as “175 East 104th Street, New York, New York”); see MNN El
Barrio
Firehouse
Community
Media
Center,
MANHATTAN
NEIGHBORHOOD
NETWORK,
https://www.mnn.org/firehouse (last visited Aug. 22, 2021) (providing the address of the El Barrio Firehouse
facility as “175 E 104th Street, New York, NY 10029”).
221.
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which was so significant to the majority230—that MNN formally granted at least
some meaningful property interest in its facilities to the City of New York. 231
Even without the formal covenant, the various opinions in Denver Area
demonstrate the Court’s understanding that public access channels, as established
under franchise agreements, are subject to some property interest held by the
franchising government.232 Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
observed that public access channels are reserved “as part of the consideration
[cable operators] give municipalities” in exchange for the award of a franchise.233 In
effect, this reservation operates much as a public easement or public dedication of
private property to public use. 234 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 235
went further to find expressly that public access channels meet the definition of a
public forum.236 Justice Kennedy observed that in some cases, formal title to
traditionally recognized public fora, like streets and sidewalks, might be held
privately but that title is “held in trust for the use of the public.”237 For Justice
Kennedy, the lack of a formal easement was irrelevant to finding that the
government had sufficient property interest in the public access channels to make
them a public forum.238
Further, the Denver Area Court distinguished significantly between the history
and character of leased access channels versus public access channels in reaching
its decision.239 In the same decision where the Court rejected Congress’s grant of
authority for cable operators to censor indecent content on public access channels
under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 240
the Court upheld a substantially similar authorization to censor content on leased
access channels.241 The plurality opinion observed that Congress, when it required
230.

Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1933.
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., supra note 226, at 2.
232. Compare Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 760–61 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]he requirement to reserve capacity for public access channels is similar to the reservation of a
public easement, or a dedication of land for streets and parks . . . .”), with id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Public access channels are analogous [to
private property held in trust for the use of the public]; they are public fora even though they operate over
property to which the cable operator holds title.”).
233. Id. at 760 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 760–61.
235. Justice Stevens also noted his endorsement of Justice Kennedy’s analysis, but he did “not think it
necessary to characterize the public access channels as public fora.” Id. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
237. Id. at 792 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
238. Id. at 793–94.
239. Id. at 760 (plurality opinion).
240. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10, 106 Stat.
1460, 1486, invalidated in part by Denver Area, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
241. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 768.
231.
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cable operators in the 1984 Cable Act to make a certain number of channels
available for commercial programmers to lease, simultaneously withheld the power
of cable operators to exercise editorial control over the leased channels. 242 In the
provision of the 1992 Act upheld by the Denver Area Court, Congress had restored
a small portion of the cable operator’s preexisting authority to exercise editorial
control over channels it leases to others.243 In contrast, public access channels had
not historically been subject to editorial control by cable operators. 244 When
Congress purported to give cable operators limited authority to censor content on
public access channels, it had tried to create a new censorship right that did not
previously exist.245 This view is inconsistent with a characterization of public access
channels as the private property of the cable operator, but it fits well with the view
of public access channels as a constitutional public forum.
The characterization of public access channels as a public forum is also squarely
within the Congressional purpose in supporting their creation under section 611 of
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. 246 In its report on the bill, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce declared that the Act serves to “secure[] the
First Amendment right of the viewers and listeners to a diversity of information
sources . . . .”247 The report declared that “[p]ublic access channels are often the
video equivalent of the speaker’s soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed
leaflet.”248 By enabling local franchising authorities to create public access channels,
Congress intended to bestow underrepresented communities with “the
opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of
ideas.”249
B. MNN is a State Actor by Entwinement with the City of New York
Even if MNN’s public access channels cannot be properly characterized as a
public forum, the Court still should have found that MNN is a state actor under
Burton and its progeny because the City of New York had entwined itself with
MNN’s operations. To this end, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass’n is instructive. In Brentwood Academy, the Court observed that the
Athletic Association had been designated by the State Board of Education to

242.

Id. at 734 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2)).
Id. at 743–44, 761.
244. Id. at 761.
245. Id.
246. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 601, 98 Stat. 2779, 2780 (1984)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521).
247. H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 36 (1984).
248. Id. at 30.
249. Id.
243.
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supervise interscholastic athletic activities.250 The Association’s primary source of
revenue was admission fees, supplemented by membership dues paid by member
schools.251 The Court further noted that the state board of education had the
authority to designate an unspecified number of members of the association’s
governing board, although the state designees were nonvoting members of the
board.252
Similarly, MNN enjoys its position of control over the public access channels
solely by virtue of its designation from the City of New York. 253 The Manhattan
borough president selects two of the thirteen voting members of MNN’s board of
directors,254 in contrast to the Tennessee Board of Education’s selection of an
unspecified number of nonvoting members of the Athletic Association’s governing
board.255 MNN receives its funding from grants mandated by the City in the
franchise agreement, in addition to direct financial support from the City.256 MNN
provided recorded covenants in favor of the City that its facilities would be used for
the City’s purposes.257 As the Court noted in Brentwood Academy, the
determination of entwinement with the government is heavily dependent on facts
and circumstances.258 Based on these facts, there is ample reason to find that the
City of New York had entwined itself with MNN sufficiently to support a finding of
state action.

250.

Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 292 (2001).
Id. at 299.
252. Id. at 292, 301.
253. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019).
254. Id. at 1935 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 36. In dismissing
Halleck’s complaint, the District Court applied Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. to show that MNN cannot
be a state actor because only two of thirteen members of MNN’s board are appointed by the city. Halleck v.
City of New York, 224 F. Supp. 3d 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Halleck v.
Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2018), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019). In Lebron, the Court
held that a government-created corporation with a majority of board members appointed by the government
is a state actor for constitutional purposes. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995).
However, the Court did not indicate that a corporation can only be a state actor when a majority of its board
are appointed by the government. Compare Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400 (noting that the government reserved the
permanent authority to appoint a majority of board members), with Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 291, 301
(noting that school administrators from any member school, public or private, are eligible to be elected to the
governing board and that the State Board of Education had the power to appoint only nonvoting members of
the Athletic Association’s board).
255. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
256. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1935 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 71, § 8.3; Manhattan
Cmty. Access Corp., supra note 226, at 2.
257. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text.
258. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295–96.
251.
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V. Conclusion

In Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, the Supreme Court held that
MNN, a public access channel operator, was not a state actor for First Amendment
purposes.259 However, this view is inconsistent with the Court’s prior precedents in
which the Court expressed views supporting either a finding that public access
channels were a public forum or, at a minimum, that the government had some
property interest in public access channels.260 Even if public access channels
generally are not public fora subject to First Amendment protection, under the facts
and circumstances of this case, MNN should have been found to be sufficiently
entwined with the City of New York as to support a finding of state action.261

259.
260.
261.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
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